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Forum Juridicum
PATTERNS OF THE LAW, OLD AND NEW*
JOHN C. KNoxt
In this day and age, with all their complexities of life and
human relationships, both of which are in a state of constant
flux, no man can take satisfaction in being a mere "case lawyer."
He must, if he is to be competent, and able to contribute to the
public welfare, have a knowledge of the reason and philosophy
that prompted the decision of the case on which he relies; and
any decision-as he will learn-may undergo a change that is
both sudden and startling.
Recent years, as well as the present period, have been times
of emergency. For example, in the early Thirties, when factories
and mills ceased to operate; when railroad and steamship lines
lost their traffic; when banks failed and investment houses closed
their doors; when millions of men ceased to work; and when
farmers, due to conditions beyond their control, could not market
their products; and when, also, the homes of thousands of house-
holders were under foreclosure, things were much out of place,
and something had to be done; and this was attempted.
National distress-when it is so deep and widespread that
the future offers no hope of the success of individualistic enter-
prise-is properly productive of legislation that is designed to
provide against despair and desperation. Unless needed remedies
in such situations be promptly supplied, and unless they operate
effectively, red riot and the breaking up of laws inevitably will
follow. No government worthy of the name can pursue the ex-
ample of Nero, and calmly witness the destruction of Rome. It
may be unfortunate, but it is the fact, that critical conditions
require drastic remedies. And if one will look at present day
statute books, he will readily conclude that, in the mind of Con-
gress, the word drastic begins with a capital D.
If, in so believing, Congress was in error, and if, in giving
* The substance of this article was presented as an address before the
Louisiana State University Law School students on April 24, 1946.
t United States District Judge, Southern District of New York; Lecturer
in Law, New York University School of Law.
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support to Congress, the courts were wrong, criticism against
them should be tempered by reason. In this country, basic law
cannot be written over night, and stare decisis must never be
permitted to stand in the way of relief that is essential to the
public welfare. We should always understand that if a constitu-
tion be so rigid that it cannot bend, and if legal doctrine be so
stiff that it will never yield to legitimate demand, the icy storms
of national discouragement will bring about their destruction.
No wonder, therefore, that our statute law has been multi-
plied, and that the courts, in passing upon the constitutionality
of this legislation, evolve theories that give grave concern to
many of our people.
But, this is no new development in American history. From
the beginning, judicial doctrine has been in a state of oscillation.
As much may be said of every branch of statecraft. What is
more, as much may be said of our own points of view. As each
of us is aware, individually and nationally, self interest moti-
vates both our thought and action. It is but natural, therefore,
that judicial decisions should be greatly influenced by practical
considerations of what, at a particular time, seems needful and
desirable. So far as private law is concerned, such considerations
are not so influential. If, in that branch of jurisprudence, the
judiciary adheres to a rule that is unworkable or unduly burden-
some, legislative action is usually capable of furnishing a remedy.
But, with respect to constitutional rulings, legislatures are with-
out the power of correction. The courts themselves must come
to the rescue.
Ninety-seven years ago, in The Passenger cases,' Justice
Taney announced that "the construction of the Constitution is
always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been
founded in error, and . . judicial authority should hereafter
depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is
supported. ' '2
It was not long until this principle was given practical ap-
plication. In the early days of the Republic Mr. Justice Story,
writing for the Supreme Court, in the case of The Thomas Jef-
ferson, held that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of a
federal district court was distinctly and definitely limited. The
case involved the wage contract of a seaman who had rendered
1. Smith v. Turner, Health Commissioner of the Port of N.Y., 48 U.S. 283,
12 L.Ed. 702 (1849).
2. 48 U.S. 283, 470, 12 L.Ed. 702, 781.
3. 23 U.S. 428, 6 L.Ed. 358 (1825).
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services on a steamboat that plied the Missouri River. The libel
was dismissed upon the ground that, except when a seaman did
work upon the sea, or upon the waters within the ebb and flow
of the tide, the admiralty was without jurisdiction.
Twenty-six years thereafter, the case of The Genesee Chief'
came along. A vessel bearing that name had collided with an-
other upon the waters of Lake Ontario. When the suit came be-
fore the Supreme Court, Taney was Chief Justice. He and his
associates decided diametrically opposite to the holding in the
case of the Thomas Jefferson. One of the justifications for doing
so was that
"These lakes [the Great Lakes] are in truth inland seas. Dif-
ferent states border upon them on one side, and a foreign
nation on the other. A great and growing commerce is carried
on upon them between different states and a foreign nation,
which is subject to all the incidents and hazards that attend
commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets have encountered upon
them, and prizes been made; and every reason which existed
for the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the general govern-
ment on the Atlantic seas, applies with equal force to the
lakes. There is an equal necessity for the instance and for the
prize power of the admiralty court to administer international
law, and if the one cannot be established neither can the
other."5
The real fact, of course, was that the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the growth and commercial development of the coun-
try had come to need the application of a judicial doctrine which
would support and encourage that growth and development.
In this connection, a reference to the Dartmouth College case'
may not be inappropriate. As each of us knows, it was there that
the court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, declared that
under no circumstances could a state legislature destroy the
sanctity of a contractual obligation. Had that decision remained
unmodified, the economic development of America, as we have
come to know it, might have been impossible. But, here again,
Roger B. Taney had a breadth of view quite as wide as was that of
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.' The circumstance that Taney's
4. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 13 L.Ed. 1058 (1851).
5. 53 U.S. 443, 453, 454, 13 L.Ed. 1058, 1063 (1851).
6. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 4 L.Ed. 629
(1819).
7. 22 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).
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opinion in the Charles River Bridge case 8 materially qualified,
if it did not, in effect, reverse Marshall's holding concerning the
sanctity of the charter of Dartmouth College, does nothing to
lower my estimate of Marshall's ability. Both he and Taney were
judges par excellence. But, each of them was much more than
that. Any lawyer, fortunate enough to be struck by the lightning
of presidential favor, can sit upon the bench of a federal court.
If, however, that lawyer is truly to serve the purposes which
warrant the existence of judges, he must have knowledge of
what goes on about him. He must, in addition, recognize its sig-
nificance and respect the just demands of that significance.
That is what Taney did in the Bridge case. Appreciating that
industry was on the march, and that the day of the machine was
about to dawn, the man who dared brook the enmity of Lincoln,
and who, figuratively speaking, threw the Merryman decision
in the face of the great emancipator, saw the industrial needs of
the land, and acted accordingly.
What was then said of Taney did not differ materially from
the calumny that is, today, heaped upon some of those who now sit
upon the Supreme Court of the United States. The fears of those
who opposed Taney's confirmation became absolute. He has
shown himself as being opposed to monopoly. Then, as now, in
the minds of many eminent citizens, any such demonstration
upon the part of a judge was quite enough to warrant his dam-
nation. But when all is said and done, Taney envisioned the
future and not the past. He decided merely that judicial doc-
trine, like machinery, can and does become obsolete and that
such obsolescence should not be allowed to retard the proper
functioning of national necessities. Taney, nevertheless, as I
have indicated, was subjected to violent criticism. Furthermore,
it came from those in high position. Story, for example, wrote
to Judge McLean in a most doleful tone, and this, in part, is
what he said:
"'There will not, I fear, ever in our day, be any case in which
a law of a State or of Congress will be declared unconstitu-
tional; for the old constitutional doctrines are fast fading
away, and a change has come over the public mind from
which I augur little good"'lo
One can thus see that the language used by some of our
8. Charles River Bridge v. Warren River Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
9. Ex Parte Merryman, Taney 246, Fed. Cas. No. 9487, (1861).
10. 2 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (1926) 28.
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prominent citizens in their denunciation of recent Supreme Court
decision has an ancient precedent behind it.
Story, however, did not stand alone. His satisfaction must
have been great when Kent wrote him as follows:
"'I have re-perused the Charles River Bridge case, and with
great disgust. It abandons, or overthrows, a great principle
of constitutional morality, and I think goes to destroy the
security and value of legislative franchises. It injures the
moral sense of the community, and destroys the sanctity of
contracts. If the Legislature can quibble away, or whittle
away its contracts with impunity, the people will be sure to
follow .... I have lost my confidence and hope in the con-
stitutional guardianship and protection of the Supreme
Court." 11
In spite of all this, and within a few years, the wisdom of
Taney's decision was recognized and acclaimed. It was realized
that monopolistic rights and privileges could not continue to be
implied in the issuance of every legislative charter having to do
with transportation. Were this to be done, the result, as Taney
said, would be that
"The millions of property which had been invested in rail-
roads and canals, upon lines of travel which had been before
occupied by turnpike corporations, will be put in jeopardy.
We shall be thrown back to the improvements of the last
century, and obliged to stand still until the claims of the old
turnpike corporations shall be satisfied; and they shall con-
sent to permit the states to avail themselves of the lights of
modem science, and to partake of the benefit of those im-
provements which are now adding to the wealth and pros-
perity, and the convenience and comfort, of every other part
of the civilized world."'"
Doctrine such as this is strong precedent for some of the
contemporary utterances of Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy and
Frankfurter. And while many of the pronouncements of these
men give us feelings of both apprehension and concern, who
among us, with respect to their wisdom and propriety, can fore-
cast the verdict which posterity will some time place upon them?
The passage of time, changes in thought, and the extent to which
11. Id. at 29.
12. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 552, 553 (1837).
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recent decisions contribute to national happiness and welfare
will give the ultimate answer. Possibly it will come to pass that
the New Deal justices, contrary to the expectation of many per-
sons, will be regarded as much more than intellectual puppets
who came to power in order to rationalize the political predilec-
tions of the President who appointed themn. In saying this, it is
to be remarked that the Supreme Court has frequently reversed
itself upon important questions. Take, for example, Adair v.
United States8 and Coppage v. Kansas14--one decided in 1908
and the other in 1915. In each of these cases, the court said that
yellow dog labor contracts could not be outlawed by legislative
action.
In 1930, however, in the case of Texas and New Orleans
Railway Company v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship
Clerks,15 an enactment of this character was approved. Consider
also that for a period of half a century, it was the law that only
in the matter of public utility rates could prices be regulated.
.But twelve years ago, in Nebbia v. New York,16 it was held that
the cost at which milk could be sold was within the ambit of
legislative authority. In the closing years of the last century, the
hours that miners could labor were said to be a proper subject
matter of legislative power.17 Seven years thereafter, we were
told that the working hours of bakers fell within a different
category.18 Within the next three years, when legislatures had
undertaken to prescribe the length of continuous time to which
women could devote their energies, the legislation was upheld.19
Almost a decade passed, and in 1917 it was decided that the hours
of service of all factory workers were subject to regulation.20
From this recital, anione can see that as the- evil of the sweat-
shop was appreciated, and when humanity came to know that
humanity itself is our most priceless possession, the rigidity of
the Constitution relaxed and the document became sufficiently
flexible to safeguard the health of the country's citizenship. Who
would return to the days when it was decreed that in America
industrial slavery had the support of constitutional authority?
13. 208 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764 (1908).
14. 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441, L.R.A. 1915C 960 (1915).
15. 281 U.S. 548, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (1930).
16. 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469 (1934).
17. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780 (1898).
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905).
19. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S.Ct. 324, 52 IAEd. 551, 13 Ann. Cas.
957 (1908).
20. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 37 S.Ct. 435, 61 L.Ed 820, Ann. Cas.
1918A 1043 (1917).
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And, as men now voice criticism of the lately appointed
justices, they should remember, as some do not, that most of
these controversial decisions became the law of the land long
before we heard of the New Deal. This is also true of several
other decisions. For example, the first of the Tennessee Valley
cases,2 1 two of the Labor Board cases, 22 the Washington State
minimum wage case,22 and the social security cases " were de-
cided before any one of Mr. Roosevelt's appointees 25 went upon
the court. It also is worthy of note that in several other decisions
of liberal tendencies and far reaching results, the votes of the
new judges did not affect the outcome. In other words, the old
court, recognizing that it could not indefinitely resist the ex-
pressed will of Congress and remain insensible to the ground
swell of public opinion, spread its sheets, and on its own initiative,
set sail upon Norris Dam. It were better, perhaps, both for the
country and the prestige of the Supreme Court, had that tribunal
made earlier and more willing response than was given to what
the public regarded as just demands.
As a result of the Court's failure to take note of changing
conditions and to understand their implications, the safe ports of
constitutionalism are not so plentiful as once they were. Many
of them have been closed by the mine fields of public clamor
and uproar. The bombs laid by these agencies will not be swept
away until considered opinion and reasoned judgment again
find lodgement in the national consciousness. We can only specu-
late as to when that time will come.
But this I do believe-The indispositions from which we have
suffered, and many of which continue to afflict us, and which
have moved Congress to enact legislation that has proved em-
barrassing to the courts, are due merely to our own neglect and
carelessness in solving the problems that are incident to a highly
complicated way of living. Engrossed in our own affairs, we
momentarily forgot that fair dealing, honest government, capable
21. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466,
80 L.Ed. 688 (1936).
22. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937); Associated Press v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937).
23. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed.
703 (1937).
24. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279
(1937); Helverking v. Davis, 301 U.S. 634, 57 S.Ct. 906, 81 L.Ed. 311 (1937).
25. Mr. Justice Mugo L. Black, who took his seat on October 4, 1937, was
the first Roosevelt appointee on the court,
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administration, and an appreciation of realities, together with
high patriotism, are the essentials of a democracy.
Furthermore, we also forgot that, in the last analysis, the
citizens of a free government should be the masters of their own
destinies. Paternalism in government should never be substituted
for a people's self reliance. Upon self reliance we have endured,
and upon self reliance we should continue to live. Save in times
of great disaster and unusual emergency, government should do
no more than see that the fields whereon we wage the contests
of life shall be open, free and clear; that the rules shall be fair
and just-that in the games no fouls be permitted; that the um-
pires shall have no favorites; and that those who win the prizes
shall have and enjoy the fruits of victory.
In days gone by, representative democracy has achieved
these ends. It can do so again. It must do no less. It is required,
however, that straightforwardness and honest dealing shall be-
come a way of life. Along that way, public officials, and each of
us must walk. Unless democracy lives in the hearts of men, unless
public officials be animated by a spirit of democracy, and unless
the populace, in honest endeavor, seeks the administration of
democracy, and will submit to nothing else, our Constitution, the
labors of the Congress, the action of an executive, and the dec-
larations of the judiciary, will be as phantasies of the night, which
disappear at the dawn.
What has so far happened, with respect to modern day hold-
ings of the Supreme Court, will not prove fatal to our system
of jurisprudence. About that tribunal there has ever been a tra-
dition of justice and an atmosphere of high statesmanship. It
may be that we would be better off had the court exercised more
restraint than has recently been apparent. Nevertheless, if we
exercise restraint upon ourselves, and are willing to adhere to
the fundamentals of justice, and are willing that fair and even
handed justice be administered, the courts, sooner or later, will
follow our lead. They will also adopt our philosophy.
So long as men who interpret the Constitution are endowed
with a sense of their responsibility; and so long as all of us are
fired with the conviction that America is worthy of preservation,
we need have no fear of decisions of the Supreme Court which
do not always accord with our concepts of constitutional inter-
pretation.
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